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m some manner or bears some relation to its 
eJJforcemcnt. Co. v. Sttperior Court, 24 
632 [130 P.2cl 881]; VVill?.ams v. Conrt, 
Cal.2cl 666 P.2d 334] ; .McCord Co. v. Plotnick, 
104 Cal.App.2d 496 P.2d 880] .) 'l'he trial court, 
in the corrections, apparently treated the 
motion as a request for correction of the transcript under 
le 8 of the Hules on In an analogous situation, 
where the trial court denied a motion to amend a reporter's 
transcript by striking out certain words in the answer of a 
witness and inserting others, it 1vas held that the order was 
not as a special order after final judgment since 
it dicl not affect the judgment or its enforeement. (McCord 
Co. v. 104 Cal.App.2d 495, 496 [231 P.2d 880] .) 
Similarly, in Cross v. Tustin, 37 Cal.2d 821, 825-826 [236 
P.2d , orders denying motions to vaeate and amend a 
settled statement of oral proceedings were held nonappealable. 
[4] It is elear that no appeal lies from the order under eon-
sideration here. If, however, the record is defieient in any 
respect, defendant may app1y to the Distriet Court of Appeal 
for augmentation under rule 12 of the Rules on Appeal. 
rrhe appeal is dismissed. 
Shenk, .J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Sehauer, ,J., eoncurred. 
[Crim. No. 5722. In Bank. JulyS, 1955.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. MARY PENNY, 
Appellant. 
Homicide-Evidence-Cause of Death.-In prosecution of face 
rejuvenator for manslaughter, evidence that phenol was found 
in liver and blood of victim and opinions of physician and 
autopsy surgeon that solution used on victim's face and neck 
contained phenol in excess of 10 per cent are sufficient to 
show that victim died of phenol poisoning. 
[2] Criminal Law-Evidence-Expert Testimony.-In prosecution 
of face rejuvenator for manslaughter, it is not error to admit 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 289 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence, 
§ 798 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 156; [2] Criminal Law, 
§ 555(8); [3] Criminal Law, § 556; [4] Criminal Law, § 658(6); 
[5, 6] Homicide, § 174; [7] Criminal Law, § 637; [8] Homicide, 
§§ 25, 26; [9] Homicide, § 26; [10] Homicide,§ 27. 
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864 PEOPLE v. PE~NY [44 C.2d 
that she had no license from either the Cosmetology Board 
or the Medical Board of this state ; she did have a business 
license from the city of Los for the business of "Face 
Rejuvenation.'' 
Defendant had a year's training with a Madame Bergeron 
(now deceased) in Los Angeles and approximately three 
months' training with one Geraldine Gorman in New York. 
In New York, she received the formula which she used in her 
work. The formula consisted of one ounce of a heaping 
tablespoon of resorcinol (of the same chemical group) and 
16 drops of phenol (carbolic acid). 
Kay Stanley, the victim, had consulted with defendant 
some seven months earlier about having her face treated to 
remove wrinkles and pock marks, but did not have the money 
to do it at that time. Around Easter time of 1953, she again 
asked defendant to treat her face, but defendant was to be 
away and could not do it then. On the morning of May 4, 
1953, Kay Stanley arrived at about 10 in the morning at 
defendant's home where she -vvas to during the treatment. 
Kay's face was first washed with warm ·water and soda; 
the formula was then applied with a cotton wrapped wooden 
applicator to Kay's cheeks, a square inch at a time. After 
each application, the area was pressed with sterile gauze to 
remove excess moisture. The entire forehead was covered as 
well as the eyelids, the process about two hours. The 
treated area was then covered with gauze and taped with 
small pieces of tape which overlapped and covered the area; 
regular waterproof adhesive tape was then put on over the 
other tape; this formed a mask over the upper portion of 
the patient's face. After the taping had been completed, Kay 
walked to an adjoining room where she had lunch, listened 
to the radio and looked at magazines. At approximately 6 
in the evening, defendant proceeded to treat the lower half 
of Kay's face in the same manner as she had treated the 
upper portion which took about three quarters of an hour. 
When the treatment was completed, Kay asked defendant if 
she could sit up for awhile before the taping was started; 
she sounded sleepy. The defendant told her she could and 
said she would get her a glass of water. ·when defendant re-
turned with the water, Kay said, "I feel a little bit faint" 
and lay back as though in a faint. Defendant asked her how 
she felt but received no answer. When defendant tried to 
lift her she found she was dead weight and felt that she had 
fainted. Defendant tried unsuccessfully to call a Dr. Wallace 
J PEOPLE v. PENNY 
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and left a message for him; she then called a nurse-anaesthetist 
who arrived at the house about 10 or 15 minutes later. Mrs. 
Jevne, the nurse, tried to take the patient's pulse without 
success; there was no respiration. She then administered 
Coramine, a heart stimulant by hypodermic needle, in the 
arm; she then gave a hypodermic injection of Metrazol, an-
other stimulant; she then tried artificial respiration and 
caffeine benzoate. She told defendant to call the doctor again. 
Dr. Wallace arrived about an hour after Mrs. Jevne did and 
examined the lady whom he found lying on the treatment 
table. He was able to feel no pulse and there was no res-
piration. He noticed signs indicating death had existed for 
some period of time. 
Defendant called her attorney who called the police. 
The finding, after an autopsy had been had, was that the 
immediate cause of death was phenol (carbolic acid) poisoning 
and edema of the glottis due to ''application of phenol-
containing mixture to the face and neck." Other findings 
were that 5.1 milligrams of phenol per 100 grams were found 
in the liver and 2.9 milligrams of phenol per 100 grams were 
found in the blood of the victim. It was the opinion of Dr. 
Newbarr, prosecution witness and chief autopsy surgeon for 
the Los .Angeles coroner's office, that these findings were 
the result of the application of a solution containing more 
than 10 per cent phenol to the face and neck of the victim. 
It was the opinion of Mr . .Abernathy, the toxicologist, that 
the reddish-brown discoloration of the victim's face was a 
third degree burn caused by phenol, and that the normal 
finding of phenol in a normal human being would be prac-
tically zero. 
There was evidence in the record which showed that the 
victim had been taking reducing pills prescribed by a Texas 
doctor; that in order to obtain replacement of the pills, it 
was necessary for her to have her heart examined and blood 
pressure taken by a local doctor ; that prior to going to the 
defendant's home for the face rejuvenation treatment she 
had had her heart and pulse examined and her blood pressure 
taken and that all findings were normal. 
[1] The defendant testified that when she first received 
the formula for face rejuvenation she had it analyzed and 
that it contained only 3.1 per cent phenol. The defense also 
took the position that the victim may have had an allergy 
to phenol which was the cause of death. Dr. Newbarr testified 
for the prosecution and gave, as his opinion, that the solution 
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any branch thereof without a license therefore issued by the 
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State Board establishment other 
than one licensed 1s 
of a misdemeanor. 
'"l'he art of includes 
arms, bust or upper 
the use of cosmetic lotions 
creams. 
"A violation of this law is an unlawful act not 
to a 
''Business & Professions Seetion 7325 
"Business & Professions Code, Section 7321 (b) " 
It is that under these two instructions defendant 
could have been convicted (1) if the jury believed she used 
a solution containing more than 10 per cent phenol and had 
a license; or (2) that she was because she was required 
to have a license and had none. 
[5] There can be no doubt but that the instruction con-
cerning a "licensed" cosmetologist was erroneous and that 
it had no foundation in the evidence. On the issue of 
defendant's guilt, the jury could well have inferred that 
she was guilty of the crime by reasoning that even a lieensed 
cosmetologist could not use a solution containing more than 
10 per cent phenol. [6] So far as the second instruction is 
concerned, it is supported by the evidence and correctly stated 
the law as it relates to those practicing cosmetology and 
the persons considered engaged in that practice. It appears 
to us that as a matter of law, defendant was engaged in the 
practice of cosmetology and the jury should have been so 
instructed. 
[7] We said in People v. Thomas, 25 Cal.2d 880, 897 [156 
P.2d 7], that the responsibility of statutory construction 
should not be left to the jury; that the interpretation of a 
statute and the question of its applicability to any given set 
of facts are exclusively the province of the court. 
[8] The next question which presEmts itself is whether 
defendant's laek of a lieense (and the fact that she was, 
therefore, guilty of a misdemeanor) was the cause of 1\Irs. 
Stanley's death. Section 192.2 of the Penal Code provides 
that a person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter if a 
human being is unlawfully killed ''in the commission of an 
unlawful act, not amounting to a felony; ... " 'l'he jury 
1vas instructed that defendant's conduct must have been the 
proximate cause of the death. The People argue that the 
law requiring licensing of those practicing cosmetology was 
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868 PEOPLE v. PENNY [44 C.2d 
uc''"<'•uc•u to prevent to others and that one who violates 
such a law may be guilty of manslaughter if death is caused 
thereby, People v. Mitchell, 27 Cal.2d 678, 683 [166 
P.2d . The Mitchell case involved section 500 of the 
Vehicle Code which provided "When the death of any person 
ensues within one year as the proximate rest~lt of injuries 
caused the of any vehicle with reckless disregard . 
. . . " and is not applicable here. Moreover, in the Mitchell 
case it was specifically noted that the provisions of the Penal 
Code ( § 192) defining involuntary manslaughter should not 
apply to homicide caused by the driving of any vehicle. In 
People v. J{errick, 86 Cal.App. 542, 548 [261 P. 756], a case 
factually dissimilar to the one under consideration, the court 
said: "\Ve cannot ignore the element of causation in the 
unlawful act necessary to connect it with the offense. In our 
ordinary phraseology we refer to the result of this element 
by saying it must be the probable consequence naturally 
flowing from the commission of the unlawful act.'' A causal 
connection was also held essential in People v. Goodale, 33 
Cal.App.2d 80, 83 [91 P.2d 163] ; People v. Httrley, 13 Cal. 
App.2d 208 [56 P.2d 978], and People v. Frettdenberg, 121 
Cal.App.2d 564 [263 P.2d 875]. It is extremely dubious 
that defendant's lack of a license had any causal connection 
with Mrs. Stanley's death and yet it should be noted that 
the statute (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7415) provides that if a 
licensed cosmetologist uses a solution of phenol greater than 
10 per cent on any human being, he, or she, is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. Had defendant been a licensed cosmetologist, 
under the evidence she would have been guilty of a mis-
demeanor, and, as a result, the first clause of section 192.2 
of the Penal Code would have been directly applicable. 
[9] Another question which presents itself is whether 
defendant was guilty of an unlawful act in applying a solu-
tion containing phenol and resorcinol to the human face and 
neck with the knowledge that both chemicals were poisonous. 
The statute providing that a licensed cosmetologist may not 
use a solution containing greater than 10 per cent phenol 
without being guilty of a misdemeanor sets the standard for 
licensed persons in that profession or occupation. In dis-
cussing the violation of a criminal statute as a basis for a 
suit for civil damages, we said in Clinkscales v. Carver, 22 
Ca1.2d 72, 75 [136 P.2d 777], "When a legislative body has 
generalized a standard from the experience of the community 
and prohibits conduct that is likely to cause harm, the court 
was 
jury could have concluded that her treatment was one which 
could have caused death. 
44 C.2d-28 
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870 PEOPLE v. PENNY [44 C.2d 
'!'he jury was also instructed that "The doing of an act 
ordinarily lawful which results in the death of a human 
being Inay be manslaughter where the act, being one which 
might cause death, is performed in an unlawful manner or 
·without due caution and circumspection. When a person is 
doing anything dangerous in itself or has charge of anything 
dangerous in its use and acts with reference thereto without 
taking those proper precautions which a person of ordinary 
prudence would have used under the circumstances and the 
death of another results therefrom, his act or neglect is a 
criminal act against the person so killed.'' The People con-
tend that these two instructions harmonize with the case of 
People v. Pociask, 14 Cal.2d 679, 683-684 [96 P.2d 788]. 
The Pociask case involved a death resulting from a violation 
of section 500 of the V chicle Code then in effect which re-
ferred to the driving of any vehicle in a "negligent manner." 
The court there said in answering the question of what con-
stitutes criminal negligence, that the court is bound to apply 
an appropriate definition enacted by the Legislature and that 
section 500 of the V chicle Code had made criminal the neg-
ligent driving of a vehicle which caused injuries to another 
proximately resulting in death within the time specified in 
the section. 
While the last quoted instruction was substantially* that 
which was used in People v. Wilson, 193 Cal. 512 [226 P. 5] 
(an automobile case) and approved in the Pociask case, the 
court specifically noted that what might ''amount to a lack 
of 'due caution and circumspection' in cases of involuntary 
manslaughter committed in the doing of a lawful act, or 
what may constitute the driving of a vehicle 'in a negligent 
manner,' are questions to be decided by the jury according 
to the particular facts in each case guided by appropriate 
instructions from the court.'' 
Defendant relies on the rules set forth in People v. Driggs, 
supra, 111 Cal.App. 42, and People v. Hurley, supra, 13 
Cal.App.2d 208, wherein the rule was said to be: "In order 
to constitute criminal negligence, there must enter into the 
act some measure of wantonness or :flagrant or reckless dis-
regard of the safety of others, or wilful indifference. If no 
one of these elements enters into the act, the person charged 
cannot be held guilty of criminal negligence." (People v. 
•·The following words were omitted from the inst~uction in the instant 
case: ''even though his negligence does not amount to a wanton or 
reckless disregard of human safety or life.'' 
July 1953] PEOPijE 'V. PENNY 
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Driggs, at page 47.) As '.Ve read the Pociask case which 
approved the instruction given in Pcoz)le v. W·ilson, supra, 
193 Cal. 512, which was almost* the same as that here given, 
wherein it is said (p. 84), "Anything in the Driggs and 
Hurley cases ineonsistrnt must be deemed to be 
disapproved,'' it appears that the requirement of wantonness, 
flagrant or reckless disregard the safety of others, or 
wilful indifference, was deleted from the definition of criminal 
negligenee or laek of due care and circumspection. 
The law in California as to what constitutes "criminal 
negligence'' or a lack of ''due caution and circumspection'' is 
confused. 
The cases of People v. D1·iggs, stLpra, 111 Cal.App. 42, and 
People v. Hurley, snpra, 13 Cal.App.2d 208, which held that 
some measure of wantonness or flagrant or reckless disregard 
of the safety of others must enter into defendant's conduct 
before he could be held guilty of criminal negligence, were 
disapproved in People v. Pociask, supra. 'l'he Driggs case 
involved assault with intent to commit murder; the Hurley 
case involved death caused by the driving of an automobile. 
The Pociask case which disapproved th<:'m involved the neg-
ligent driving of an automobile and the interpretation of a 
statute (former section 500, Vehicle Code) which specifically 
made criminal the negligent driving of a vehicle. The in-
struction in Pcopl e v. Wilson, S1tpra, 193 Cal. 512 (which is 
substantially the same as the one here involved) was approved 
by the Pociask case. 'l'he '\Vilson case was a manslaughter 
conviction arising out of the negligent driving of a motor 
vehicle. The court in the Pociask case, S1tpl'rt, comments on 
the opinion of the Supreme Court in denying a hearing in 
the case of v. Sei~er, 57 Cal.App. 195 [207 P. 396], 
wherein it vYas said: "The statute (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. 2) 
defines involuntary manslaughter of this specific character 
as the unlawful killing of a human being, involuntarily, 
but 'in the commission of a lawful act which might produce 
death ... ·without due caution and circumspection.' In order 
to constitute this kind of manslaughter the act may be lawful 
but it must be one which might produc~e death, and which 
does produce death, and it mnst be committed without due 
caution and circumspection. The lack of due caution and 
circumspeetion need not go to the extent of being ·wanton, or 
reckless, although it might possibly be s11ch as would be de-
fined as cnlpable.'' (Emphasis addrd.) In 1941 the negligent 
*See previous footnote. 
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874 PEOPLE v. PENNY [44 C.2d 
resulted because of an abortion and defendant was convicted 
of manslaughter. It was noted that the deceased came to her 
death by reason of the ''gross negligence'' of defendant and 
his "negligence" and "careless and incompetent treatment." 
In People v. Monteeino, 66 Cal.App.2d 85, 102 [152 P.2d 
5], which involved the death of an elderly, bedridden woman 
by reason of the brutal treatment and lack of care on the 
part of defendant, the court held that ''it is established in 
the State of California that involuntary manslaughter may 
result even though the conduct of the offender is not wanton 
or reckless. See comment by the Supreme Court in denying 
a hearing in People v. Seiler (1922), 57 Cal.App. 195 [207 
P. 396], ... " The Seiler case, as heretofore noted, was 
a negligent driving case. 
In People v. Chavez, 77 Cal.App.2d 621, 628 [176 P.2d 92], 
defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter because 
she failed to use "due care" or "any of the care" necessary 
for the welfare of her newborn baby. It was said: "While 
it is conceivable that in some such cases the mental and 
physical condition of a mother, at the time, might prevent her 
from exercising that reasonable eare which would ordinarily 
be required ... '' that such was not the case at hand. (Em-
phasis added.) 
In People v. Neff, 117 Cal.App.2d 772 [257 P.2d 47], 
death occurred by reason of carbon monoxide escaping from 
a badly vented gas heater. The court there cited the auto-
mobile-manslaughter cases, particularly People v. Pociask, 
supra, 14 Cal.2d 679, and People v. Seiler, supra, 57 Cal. 
App. 195, in discussing the instructions given. The follow-
ing instruction was given there: "Due caution and circum-
spection, as those words are used in the instruction just given, 
means such caution and circumspection as are reasonably 
appropriate to avoid injury to one's self and others, under the 
conditions at hand as they would be viewed by an ordinary 
reasonable person in the same situation as the person whose 
conduct is in question. To exercise due care and circum-
spection is to take those proper precautions which a person 
of ordinary prudence would use in the same circumstances. 
[ C ondttct does not need to am01lnt to wantonness or to reck-
lessness to show and to constitute a lack of due care and 
circumspection.] " The District Court of Appeal there held: 
''The court should not have included in its instructions the 
statement to the effect that a lack of due caution and circum-
spection need not amount to wantonness or recklessness. 
July 1955] PEOPLE v. PENNY 
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People's instruction No. 16, except for the statement therein 
in brackets (to the effect that the conduct need not amount 
to wantonness or recklessness), was a proper instruction.'' 
(P. 785.) This statement could mean an approval of former 
decisions tbat ·wantonness or recklessness was necessary, or 
just an attempt to satisfy former deeisions as they related to 
vehicle-manslaughter. 
In People v. Freudenbe1·g, supra, 121 Cal.App.2d 564, 
580, v>here death resuJted from a firearm, the jury was held 
properly instructed as follows: "The doing of an act ordi-
narily lawful which results in the death of a human being 
may be manslaughter where the act, being one which might 
cause death, is performed in an unlawful manner or without 
due caution or circumspection. \Vhen a person is doing any-
thing dangerous in itself or has charge of anything dangerous 
in its use and acts with referenee thereto without taking 
those proper precautions which a person of ordinary prudence 
would have used under the circumstances, and the death of 
another results therefrom, his act or neglect is a criminal act 
against the person so killed even thmtgh his negligence does 
not amount to a wanton or reckless disregard of human safety 
or Uf e."* (Emphasis added.) 
In People v. Mahoney, 201 Cal. 618, 629 [258 P. 607], de-
fectively constructed grandstands collapsed and a woman was 
killed as a result thereof. \Nhilc very few facts appear in 
the opinion, the court said: ''The prosecution of the appellant 
was had under section 192 of the Penal Code, defining the 
crime of manslaughter, and upon the theory that in the erec-
tion and construction of the stands the appellant did not 
exercise due caution and circumspection. We deem it un-
necessary to review the nea1·ly two thousand pages of testi-
mony taken in the court below. It suffices to say that there 
is evidence from which the jury might well conclude that the 
grandstand which collapsed was so negligently constructed 
as to be unable to carry the tremendous load placed upon it.'' 
(Emphasis added.) It would appear that in this particular 
case, ''negligence'' and ''due caution and circumspeetion'' 
\Yere considered synonymous. 
In People v. McGee, 31 Cal.2d 229, 238 [187 P.2d 706], 
which involved a manslaughter conviction, it was held proper 
to give the code definition of involuntary manslaughter (Pen. 
Code, § 192, sub d. 2) beeause "If defendant, as he testified, dis-
charged the pistol with intent only to frighten, and not to 
*Emphasized portion is not found in instruction in present case. 

Two law review notes 
seek to harmonize the 
the Vehicle 
877 
entitled '' Homi-
to reconcile the 
that section 20 of the 
ln 
written to 1945 when the involuntary manslaughter 
statute was enacted in its form. 
It is pointed out in 28 California Law Review 518, 519, 
that a review of the available of the half century 
prior to 1872 section 20 o.f the Penal Code was enacted) 
supports the conclusion that ''criminal '' had a 
common law at that time which must be referred 
to in determining the efreet of its inclusion in section 20. 
'l'he English reports of the reveal a well established 
rule that gross is necessary in criminal prosecu-
tions, and that the term "criminal negligence" was used 
along with many others to characterize the of neglect 
required. It is said that there was to show that the 
I1egislature intended to section 192 of the Penal Code 
from the operation of section 20 of the same code. In speaking 
of v. 14 Cal.2d 679 P.2d , it was 
noted that "having of the defendant's argument by 
holding that 'criminal ' was 11ot necessary under 
section 500 of the V ehiele it was not necessary for the 
court to resolve the eonfiict between the Driggs and Hurley 
cases, an element of wantonness as contended by 
defendant, and cases holding· that deliberate dis-
regard of the of others is not necessary to a prosecution 
for manslaughter; yet the court took the occasion to repudiate 
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the two cases relied upon by defendant. Neither the previous 
authority nor the principal case hold that civil negligence 
is sufficient in manslaughter cases, but only that offered defini-
tions of 'due caution and circumspection' were incorrect or 
else did not add anything. Still other California cases, never 
overruled, require a degree of negligence beyond that neces-
sary to civil liability, so there is still room for doubt as to 
how the court conceives 'criminal negligence' to be defined 
in section 192.'' It is concluded that an instruction that a 
defendant should not be convicted of manslaughter for the 
usual lack of ordinary care would be much more favorable 
to the defendant, more understandable and more in accord 
with the established practice in most other jurisdictions 
than the supposedly self-explanatory ''due caution and cir-
cumspection.'' 
In the other note (25 Cal.L.Rev. 1, 30) is found this state-
ment: "The main question is, therefore, what does 'without 
due caution and circumspection' mean; what degree of cul-
pability is required~ The law on this point seems in California 
to be less settled and less clear than in other jurisdictions.'' 
After quoting an instruction identical with the one in the 
present case except for the words ''even though his negligence 
does not amount to a wanton or reckless disregard of human 
safety or life'' which are not present in our case, the writer 
notes that ''It is not easy to understand the true significance 
of this rule. Did the supreme court therein formulate the 
proposition that ordinary (civil) negligence would suffice to 
constitute manslaughter? Certainly California has widened the 
concept of criminal negligence necessary to constitute man-
slaughter further than most of the other jurisdictions. But 
it does not seem correct to say that the quoted passages from 
People v. Seiler and People v. Wilson [both automobile-man-
slaughter cases] are authority for the proposition that the 
negligence which suffices as the basis for civil liability and 
the negligence which is the foundation for criminal liability 
under the manslaughter statute are of the same degree. To 
be sure the language of the court contains a term which is 
customarily used in the definition of civil negligence, namely, 
the following: 'precautions which a person of ordinary pru-
dence could have used under the circumstances.' But as a 
whole the definition differs from that of ordinary negligence, 
including, as it does, the element of something dangerous in 
itself or in its use. Furthermore, the court admitted in the 
quoted passage from People v. Seiler that the lack of due 
July 1955] PEOPLE v. PENNY 
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caution and circumspection might be such as would be defined 
as culpable, even though this word was not considered to be 
a proper term to convey the significance of due caution and 
circumspection. '' 
In the two most recently filed civil liability cases before 
this court (Jensen v. Jliinard, ante, p. 325 [282 P.2d 7] and 
Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co., ante, p. 310 [282 P.2d 
12]) we were concerned with personal injuries occurring 
because of the negligent handling of dangerous instrumentali-
ties (a gun, and shooting gallery cartridges). \Ve concluded, 
in both cases, that the standard of care in such cases was so 
great that a slight deviation therefrom would constitute neg-
ligence. In the case at hand, the jury was instructed in part 
that '' vVhen a person is doing anything dangerous in itself 
or has charge of anything dangerous in its use and acts with 
reference thereto without taking those proper precautions 
which a person of ordinary prudence would have used under 
the circumstances and the death of another results therefrom, 
his act or neglect is a criminal act against the person so 
killed." It appears that this instruction is the same principle 
we have so recently applied in civil liability cases. 
The statute (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. 2) provides (in part) 
that in order to convict a person of involuntary manslaughter, 
there shall be an unlawful l~:illing of a human being in the 
commission of a lawful act which might produce death without 
due caution and circumspecton. The words lack of "due 
caution and circumspection" have been heretofore held to 
be the equivalent of "criminal negligence" (Pen. Code, § 20). 
The general rule is set forth in 26 American Jurisprudence, 
Homicide, section 210, page 299, as follows: "The au-
thorities are agreed, in the absence of statutory regulations 
denouncing certain acts as criminal, that in order to impose 
criminal liability for a homicide caused by negligence, there 
must be a higher degree of negligence than is required to 
establish negligent default on a mere civil issue. The negli-
gence must be aggravated, culpable, gross, or reckless, that 
is, the conduct of the accused must be such a departure from 
what would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent or careful 
man under the same circumstances as to be incompatible 
with a proper regard for human life, or, in other words, a 
disregard of human life or an indifference to consequences.'' 
The article continues thus: ''Aside from the facts that a more 
culpable degree of negligence is required in order to establish 
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cases. Defendant here \Yith a violation of section 
192, subdivision 2, of the Penal Code. The should have 
been instructed to the rule ·which pre-
vails in this as to what constitutes criminal negligence, 
or lack of due caution and so that her guilt 
or innocence be determined in accord therewith. 
Because of the errors heretofore the judgment is 
reversed. 
C. J., and Schauer, concurred. 
